Some decisions we make—such as becoming a parent or moving to a different part of the world—are transformative. According to L. A. Paul, transformative decisions pose a major problem to us because they fall outside the realm of rationality. Her argument for that conclusion rests on the premise that subjective value is central in transformative decisions. This paper challenges that premise and hence the overall conclusion that transformative decisions usually are not rational. In the theoretical part of the paper, we (...) specify conditions under which transformative decisions are possibly rational and likely rational. The data we present in the empirical part of the paper reveal that subjective value often plays only a minor role in people’s decision-making process. Putting both parts together, we argue that people have a great chance of making rational transformative choices. (shrink)

In the last seven years, philosophers have discussed the topic of transformative experiences. In this paper, we contribute to a crucial issue that is currently under-researched: transformative experiences' influence on cognitive modelling. We argue that cognitive modelling can be operationalized as affective forecasting, and we compare transformative and non-transformative experiences with respect to the ability of affective forecasting. Our finding is that decision-makers’ performance in cognitively modelling transformative experiences does not systematically differ from decision-makers’ performance in cognitively modelling non-transformative experiences. (...) This claim stands in strict opposition to L.A. Paul’s main argument. (shrink)

Mit Geschichte der Philosophie im 19. Jahrhundert" gibt der Padagoge und Philosoph August Messer einen Uberblick uber die wichtigsten Personlichkeiten und Denkrichtungen jener Zeit. Fichte, Hegel, Schleiermacher und Schelling sind hierbei jeweils grossere Abschnitte gewidmet. Sorgfaltig bearbeiteter Nachdruck der Originalausgabe von 1920.

This article uses Christopher Southgate's work and engagement with other scholars on the topic of evolutionary theodicy as a case study in the dialogue of science and Christian theology. A typology is outlined of ways in which the voices of science and the Christian tradition may be related in a science–theology dialogue, and examples of each position on the typology are given from the literature on evolution and natural evil. The main focus is on Southgate's evolutionary theodicy and the alternative (...) proposal by Neil Messer. By bringing these two accounts into dialogue, some key methodological issues are brought into focus, enabling some conclusions to be drawn about the range and limits of fruitful methodological possibilities for dialogues between science and Christian theology. (shrink)

In hard cases of comparison, people are faced with two options neither of which is conceived of as better, worse, or equally good compared to the other. Most philosophers claim that hard cases can indeed be distinguished from cases in which two options are equally good, and can be characterized by a failure of transitive reasoning. It is a much more controversial matter and at the heart of an ongoing debate, whether the options in hard cases of comparison should be (...) interpreted as incomparable, on par, or roughly equal. So far, however, none of these claims and interpretations have been tested. This paper presents the first empirical investigation on hard cases, intransitive reasoning, and incomparability. Our results reveal that hard cases present real-world dilemmas in which a significant majority of people violate transitivity. After suggesting a way of operationalizing the notion of incomparability, we provide empirical evidence that the options in some hard cases are not considered to be incomparable. Theories of rough equality or parity seem to provide better interpretations of our results. (shrink)

Commitments are crucial for our lives but there is no consensus on how commitments and preferences relate to each other. In this paper, we present three empirical studies that provide evidence that people sometimes choose a less preferred option when they have made a commitment.

The possibility of proving the existence of God has fascinated thinkers and believers throughout the centuries. For those like Richard Swinburne, such a project is both worthwhile and successful. For others, like D. Z. Phillips, it is wholly inappropriate. Most critics have simply taken sides at this point; but this book argues a way forward, showing that the disparity between Swinburne and Phillips goes deeper - questioning the fundamental nature of God, the meaning of religious language, and the proper task (...) of philosophy. The author argues that behind each thinker's work, and their attitudes towards proving the existence of God, lies fundamental trust. A positive discussion of relativism leads to a fresh analysis of the arguments for God's existence, particularly the ontological argument: Dr Messer shows that these are worthwhile - although not for the traditional reasons. (shrink)

Of the many futuristic prospects offered by neuroscience, one of the more controversial is ‘brain reading’: the use of functional neuroimaging to gain information about subjects’ mental states or thoughts. This technology has various possible applications, including ‘neuromarketing’ and lie detection. Would such applications violate subjects’ privacy rights? Conversely, if God knows and judges all our secret thoughts, do Christians have any stake in defending a right to mental privacy? This article argues that God’s knowledge of us is different not (...) only in degree but in kind from the knowledge sought through brain reading. This view of divine knowledge supports a theological account of privacy, richer and broader in scope than standard accounts of privacy rights, which can aid the ethical analysis of the use of brain reading technology for purposes such as marketing and lie detection. (shrink)

The editors of this volume have brought together a distinguished and truly diverse group of contributors to examine how all sorts of knowledges have been ...

This article explores whether and how research into biological influences on gender identity can and should inform Christian ethical reflection on gender diversity and gender nonconformity. First, the current state of genetic and neuroscientific research on gender identity is surveyed. While the scientific findings are as yet preliminary, tentative, and sometimes contradictory, researchers argue that they already give grounds for thinking that many biological factors have some influence on gender identity through complex interactions with many social and environmental factors. Next, (...) the article offers some general remarks about how natural scientific findings should—and should not—inform Christian theological and ethical reflection. Finally, three specific proposals are developed for how scientific research can and should inform Christian ethical reflection on gender identity. The article offers both a contribution to this Christian ethical reflection and a case study of how the natural sciences may be used in Christian ethics. (shrink)

Neil Messer brings together a range of theoretical and practical questions raised by current research on the human brain: questions about both the 'ethics of neuroscience' and the 'neuroscience of ethics'. While some of these are familiar to theologians, others have been more or less ignored hitherto, and the field of neuroethics as a whole has received little theological attention. Drawing on both theological ethics and the science-and-theology field, Messer discusses cognitive-scientific and neuroscientific studies of religion, arguing that (...) they do not give grounds to dismiss theological perspectives on the human self. He examines a representative range of topics across the whole field of neuroethics, including consciousness, the self and the value of human life; the neuroscience of morality; determinism, freewill and moral responsibility; and the ethics of cognitive enhancement. (shrink)

In this paper, we confront two prevailing views of rationality—reason- and coherence-based theories—with empirical facts. While the experimental resolution of the debate between both theories is challenging, we examine two cases in which these theories make distinct predictions regarding whether an agent is deemed rational or not. By directly pitting reason-based against coherence-based theories, our findings indicate that reasons play a more influential role in shaping people's attributions of rationality than coherence.

In his article "Disclosive Computer Ethics," Phillip Brey critiques mainstream computer ethics and argues for a disclosive computer ethic "which is concerned with the moral deciphering of embedded values and norms in computer systems, applications, and practices." 1 In this article I argue that DCE simply shifts the focus of MCE toward issues Brey deems important.

This paper offers an assessment of the prospects for Christian engagement with public bioethical debates in a contemporary British context. One recent example, the debate provoked by proposed legislation for research involving human admixed embryos, is examined briefly. It is argued that this debate has some problematic features that are characteristic of public ethical debates in this context. Next, a proposal is offered as to how such bioethical questions may be approached from within a Christian theological tradition (specifically, a Reformed (...) Protestant tradition). This proposed approach makes use of four “diagnostic questions” to assess whether technological proposals and practices such as the creation of human admixed embryos can be consistent with the distinctive Christian narrative of creation, sin, salvation through Christ, and promised future hope. The final section offers some reflections on how Christians and churches might engage, on the basis of this theological approach, with public ethical debates such as the one about admixed embryos. (shrink)

De Vries’ article essentially makes what could be called a negative case for state neuro-neutrality: identifying and refuting what he believes are the strongest arguments against it (de Vries 2024)...

This paper maps the different levels of the problem of healthcare resource allocation — micro, macro and international — with reference to three cases. It is argued that two standard approaches to the issue of distributive justice in healthcare, the QALY (quality-adjusted life year) approach and the social-contract approach developed by Norman Daniels, are fundamentally unsatisfactory for reasons identified by Alasdair MacIntyre. Although the virtue theory articulated by MacIntyre and others has been influential in many areas of healthcare ethics, there (...) seems to have been relatively little discussion of the difference it might make to the problems of resource allocation. The potential of such an approach is explored in the later sections of the paper. Two apparently promising ways of bringing virtue ethics to bear on resource allocation are examined and found wanting to greater or lesser extents. Firstly, Beauchamp and Childress’s account of the virtues as a supplement to their ‘Four Principles’ is found to have little or no substantive contribution to make to this issue. Secondly, the ‘liberal communitarian’ system of resource allocation proposed by Ezekiel Emanuel, while a considerable improvement on the account of Beauchamp and Childress, remains problematic in some respects. An alternative Christian account is developed by identifying significant influences that might shape the ‘political prudence’ which would enable Christian communities to form sound judgments about distributive justice in healthcare. The paper concludes with some remarks about the relationship between this tradition-constituted account and the wider public sphere of policy-making and practice. (shrink)

This work aims "to analyze and relate the many discussions of mystery" in the writings of Eric Voegelin. Glenn Hughes succeeds in stating Voegelin's case so clearly that even those unfamiliar with Voegelin can follow the argument. Voegelin argues that "mysteries are depths of meaning whose hiddenness is apparent". We participate in mysteries but are unable to penetrate them because of our finitude. While the appreciation of myth is a prerequisite for the philosopher, the West has seen a "peculiar and (...) growing eclipse of the awareness of mystery". The loss of the sense of mystery is a tragedy, and Voegelin's philosophy aims at rediscovering the mysterious. But how do we know the mysterious and, at the same time, not know it? To answer this question, Voegelin needs a theory of consciousness. (shrink)

The problem of understanding the concept of faith is simple--faith is a diverse phenomenon. The problem is important because: faith is not well understood; misunderstandings concerning faith have significant ramifications, and; technology brings individuals of different faiths closer together. Yet, this inquiry faces obstacles including the myriad conceptions of faith, the fervency of faith and the occasional irrationality of faith. Sessions argues against any univocal Platonic concept of faith. Instead, various concepts of faith are analogous; they share a Wittgensteinian "family (...) resemblance." But how does an analogous concept of faith comprehend faith's diversity? To answer, Sessions proposes examining six models of faith. Models serve as heuristic devices to help understand the many conceptions of faith, which in turn will elucidate the one, analogous concept of faith which gathers "together a 'family' of variously resembling and differing conceptions of faith". (shrink)

Several arguments have been put forward about the benefits of young people carrying out their own social science research in terms of empowering their voices and their participation. Much less attention has been paid to investigating the understandings young people develop about the research process itself. Seven twelve-year olds carried out self-directed social science research into a topic of their choice. Towards the end of their six months experience, we used a questionnaire and follow-up semi-structured interviews to investigate, from a (...) sociocultural perspective, what the young people thought about being a researcher. Thematic analysis of the interviews identified three themes and eight subthemes suggesting that they were aware of: the need to demonstrate researcher/research integrity ; the need for good interpersonal skills and standards, and good self-management skills (be resilient, agentic, committed and go... (shrink)

For most of its history, decision theory has investigated the rational choices of humans under the assumption of static preferences. Human preferences, however, change. In recent years, decision theory has increasingly acknowledged the reality of preference change throughout life. This Element provides an accessible introduction and new contributions to the debates on preference change. It is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, the authors discuss what preference change is and whether we can integrate it into decision theory. In (...) the second chapter, they present models of preference change, including a novel proposal of their own. In the third and final chapter, they discuss how we can rationally choose a course of action when our preferences might change. Both the transformative experience literature and recent work on choosing for changing selves are discussed. (shrink)

A collection of papers from a conference entitled ‘Eastern Orthodox and Western Christian Approaches to Bioethics’ is presented in this issue. This Editorial introduces the papers and identifies recurrent themes and questions: first, the complex relationship between faith, ethics, law and professional practice; secondly, the modes and tasks of Christian ethics or moral theology in relation to bioethical issues; thirdly, the kinds of service that academic theologians should offer to the churches, their leaders and Christians in relevant professions; fourth and (...) finally, the continuity or discontinuity between different Christian traditions. (shrink)

Hunger continues to be one of humanity's greatest challenges despite the existence of a more-than-adequate global food supply equal to 2,800 kilocalories for every person every day. In measuring progress, policy-makers and concerned citizens across the globe rely on information supplied by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), an agency of the United Nations. In 2010 the FAO reported that in the wake of the 2007–2008 food-price spikes and global economic crisis, the number of people experiencing hunger worldwide since 2005–2007 (...) had increased by 150 million, rising above 1 billion in 2009. However, in itsState of Food Insecurity in the World 2012(SOFI 12) the FAO presented new estimates, having revamped its methods and reinterpreted its hunger data back to 1990. The revised numbers for the period 1990–1992 to 2010–2012 reverse the trend to a steadily falling one. Based on the FAO's new calculations, extreme undernourishment peaked in 1990 at a record-breaking one billion, followed by a significant decline through 2006, when progress stalled but did not reverse (see chart below). (shrink)

The Cambridge Companion to Piaget provides a comprehensive introduction to different aspects of Jean Piaget's work.

Weakness of the will remains a perplexing issue. Though philosophers have made substantial progress in homing in on what counts as a weak will, there is little agreement on whether weakness of the will is irrational, and if so, why. In this paper, we take an empirical approach towards the rationality of weakness of the will. After introducing the philosophical debate, we present the results of an empirical study that reveals that people take a “dual sensitivity”, as we shall put (...) it, towards assessing the rationality of weak-willed behavior. Put succinctly, intending X against your value judgements is assessed irrational; yet, in the same situation, intending X is assessed significantly less irrational if you judge X as something you ought to do. After discussing this result, we turn to the question of whether there is a plausible theory of rationality than can account for the dual sensitivity of the rationality assessments. We show that a success-based account can make sense of the dual sensitivity our empirical results reveal. (shrink)

This paper engages with one debate in the emerging field of neuroethics. It is sometimes claimed on the strength of neuroscientific research that our actions are causally determined and therefore not truly free, or more modestly that brain structures or processes constrain some choices and actions, raising questions about our moral responsibility for them. I argue that a Reformed account of providence, sin and grace offers an account of causation able to resist hard determinism, reframes concepts of freedom and responsibility, (...) and provides a theological perspective for evaluating medical interventions in brain activity. Thus the paper not only contributes to a neuroethical debate, but also illustrates the capacity of Reformed ethics to respond creatively to novel problems. (shrink)

The concepts of health and disease are foundational to biomedical ethics. This essay critiques two widely used approaches to understanding health and disease: the World Health Organization definition of health as "complete physical, mental and social well-being," and the attempts by Thomas Szasz and Christopher Boorse to define health and disease in objective, value-free terms. Drawing particularly on the thought of Karl Barth, I argue that in Christian perspective, health must be understood in terms of the goods and goals toward (...) which human life is directed, which must themselves be understood in terms of God's good purposes made known in Christ. We are called to "will to be healthy" and resist disease, but understanding what this entails in particular concrete situations requires skills and habits of attentiveness to God's command, cultivated in the context of the Christian community and its practices. (shrink)

Vespasiano da Bisticci (1422-1498), noto editore e commerciante di manoscritti, dopo aver cessato la propria attività libraria nel 1479, si dedicò alla scrittura di biografie di personaggi eminenti del suo tempo, le cosidette Vite. Tra di esse si distingue quella di Giannozzo Manetti (1396-1459) intitolata Comentario della vita di messere Giannozo Manetti e tramandata in sei manoscritti diversi. Qui se ne propone una nuova edizione critica corredata di commenti storico-culturali e di una introduzione che mette in rilievo aspetti inediti sull'autore (...) e sull'opera. Sollevando alcune questioni, quali: perché e quando Vespasiano avrebbe composto il Comentario della vita di messere Giannozo Manetti e quale risonanza ebbe all'epoca, l'autrice formula l'ipotesi che l'opera, intesa come un mezzo di diffusione pubblicistica, sia stata redatta nella stagione politica successiva alla congiura dei Pazzi per mettere in cattiva luce il regime vigente"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Affect-based theorists and life satisfaction theorists disagree about the nature of happiness, but agree about this methodological principle: a philosophical theory of happiness should be in line with the folk concept HAPPINESS. In this article, we present two empirical studies indicating that it is affect-based theories that get the folk concept HAPPINESS right: competent speakers judge a person to be happy if and only if that person is described as feeling pleasure/good most of the time. Our studies also show that (...) the judgement that a person is feeling pleasure/good most of the time reliably brings about the judgement that they are satisfied with their life, even if that person is described as not satisfied. We suggest that this direct causal relation between the concepts POSITIVE AFFECT and LIFE SATISFACTION might explain why many philosophers have been attracted to life satisfaction theories. (shrink)

People are often faced with so called hard choices – also known as hard cases of comparison. In trying to characterize these hard choices, philosophers have made two central claims. First, failure of transitivity underlies hard cases of comparison. Second, using a random procedure is considered inappropriate in order to arrive at a decision in hard cases. While having some argumentative support, both claims primarily rely on expert intuitions. The results of the experiments we present in this paper challenge both (...) claims, as well as the representativeness of expert intuitions that support these claims, by showing that most people violate transitivity only if a hard choice is important, and find it appropriate to use a random procedure even in hard cases of comparison. (shrink)